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Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300070019-5

AIRGRAM

DEF 18-3 Smith (GE)

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FILE DESIGNATION

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A-1

HANDLING INDICATOR

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TO : Department of State

INFO :
DEPT PASS:

FROM : U.S. Delegation SALT, GENEVA DATE: November 22, 1972

SUBJECT : SALT MemCon

REF :

The attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the memorandum to Mr. Miller, Deputy Executive Secretary, S/S, dated December 6, 1971 from Mr. Christopher, Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

SMITH

Attachment *(signature)*

Garthoff-Vorontsov MemCon,
November 13, 1972.

Exempt - 1

FORM 3-70 DS-323

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Dated by:
SALDEL: RLGarthoffDrafting Date:
11/20/72

Phone No.:

Contents and Classification Approved by:
S. N. Graybeal *(signature)*

Clearances:

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SALT TWO
SESSION I
A-1

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: November 13, 1972

TIME: 1:00 to 2:30 p.m.

PLACE: Jean-Pierre Restaurant
Washington, DC

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Raymond L. Garthoff

Yulii Vorontsov
DCM, Soviet Embassy

Vorontsov invited me to lunch to discuss SALT TWO. He had returned from Moscow on November 5 after one month's home leave, during which he had met a number of times with colleagues on the Soviet SALT Delegation in Moscow. I noted that my comments were personal and unofficial.

SALT TWO - Procedural Matters

I noted that our SALT Delegation would have the same composition, less Ambassador Parsons. Vorontsov stated that the Soviet SALT Delegation would be identical with what it had been in the latter stages of SALT ONE, as far as senior delegates were concerned. He remarked that he had met Academician Shchukin for the first time, and was highly impressed by him. He also remarked that the Soviet SALT Delegation was very busy preparing for the talks, with stacks of studies and position papers.

I said that we assumed the first session would end about December 21st. Vorontsov said that the Soviet side also assumed that the work of the first session should be completed by then, and that the Christmas holiday was a natural time to recess. He asked when we thought the next session should begin. I replied that we did not have an established position. Vorontsov pressed me, and I said that I personally thought something like March might be appropriate. Vorontsov immediately said that would be "too late", and that Moscow was thinking in terms of late January or early February. Again noting that I was speaking personally and prior to official consideration of the question, and I expressed the view that such timing would be somewhat too early.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

2 .

Vorontsov repeated that there should of course be some time for preparations in January, but that it was important not to delay too long in starting the important second session.

Vorontsov confirmed that the Soviet side saw the November-December session as an occasion for an exploratory exchange of views, and did not expect to advance proposals. He said that the Soviet Delegation had a long list of questions it wished to ask the American Delegation. I expressed the hope that the Soviet Delegation would also bring some answers. Vorontsov said he hoped we would have questions to ask too, and there could be answers on both sides.

SALT TWO - Overall Substance

Vorontsov described the overall task of SALT TWO as replacement of the Interim Agreement with a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. He asked what I thought the main aspects of that task would be. I replied that this was what we hoped to consider together in the coming explorations. I noted Secretary Rogers' statement in his address to the General Assembly had referred to the need for consideration of scope of the permanent agreement, reductions, and qualitative limitations. Vorontsov said that he had noted with interest the Secretary's statement. Using that statement as a frame of reference, Vorontsov then launched into a discussion of each of the three areas, as described below. As to scope, Vorontsov said the two remaining areas were bombers and FBS.

FBS

When Vorontsov thus introduced the subject of FBS, I stated that we continued to believe that we should concentrate on central strategic systems, including heavy bombers, but not FBS. Moreover, it was not appropriate to refer to our FBS and not to Soviet non-central systems, such as medium bombers. Vorontsov contended that US FBS has a major capability directly against the USSR, which is not the case in reverse for Soviet non-central systems.

I asked if he was talking about one-way missions. He replied that our forward-based aircraft could recover in Turkey, for example. I rejoined that Soviet medium bombers could attack the US. Vorontsov interjected "and where would they go?" To which I replied "Cuba". Vorontsov said that was not realistic. I replied that islands are unsinkable aircraft carriers, and then noted that the Soviet Navy is now evidently interested in aircraft carriers. Vorontsov replied that was correct.

Vorontsov then declared that perhaps it would be possible to deal with "FBS" separately in SALT. I asked what he had in mind. Vorontsov replied

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

3

that they do not know how this can be done, but that we need together to find a way. I repeated that the US continues to believe that non-central systems of both sides must be considered together, that such systems on the two sides overall balance out, and that such systems should therefore be left out of SALT. Vorontsov said it was necessary to deal with the FBS question in SALT.

I asked about the possible relationship of forward-based systems to MBFR. Vorontsov said that was possible also, but that would not be contradictory. He asked if I had any proposition to suggest with respect to MBFR. I said I did not.

Equal Aggregates and Reductions

Turning to levels and reductions, Vorontsov referred to the Jackson Amendment, and also alleged that Senator Jackson and his friends really oppose any SALT agreements. I said that I did not believe that Senator Jackson opposed any agreement in SALT. As to the Jackson Amendment, it made no change in our position, since its only real affect is to stress equal levels of central or intercontinental systems, and that had been and remains the US position. Vorontsov agreed. (Vorontsov then remarked, in an aside, that Minister Semenov flares up at any mention of Senator Jackson and his amendment; he said that Semenov belabored him for the stand "his Senator" had taken -- Vorontsov said he had to remind Semenov that they were on the same side, and Jackson was not "his Senator".)

I stated that the US would insist on an equal aggregate, or equal levels of central intercontinental systems, however combined. I further stated that this question might perhaps be considered in conjunction with reductions, including appropriate reference to the problem of differences in missile throw-weight. I recalled that the US had proposed the level of 1900 on August 4, 1970, but that we had not decided whether under present circumstances the level should be the same, higher, or lower.

MIRV and Qualitative Limitations

Vorontsov immediately responded: What about MIRV? He stated: "The Soviet position on reductions in launchers and throw-weight would be heavily dependent on the US position on MIRVs." I asked if he meant that there should be a MIRV freeze. Vorontsov immediately objected that there could not be a freeze with the US having thousands of MIRVs and the Soviets none. He said he meant a situation where there were no MIRVs. I replied that I thought reductions would be useful irrespective of MIRVs.

I stated that the question of qualitative limitations was a particularly complex and difficult one. Vorontsov agreed, but referring to Secretary Rogers' statement, he asked whether we had in mind a possible MIRV ban, and what other qualitative limitations we might have in mind. I replied that I was not in a position to state what particular qualitative limitations might be considered.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

4

I asked what his reaction in general was to the prospect for qualitative limitations. Vorontsov said that he thought that it all depends on which limitations and on the background of other provisions.

Phased Agreements

Returning to discussion of the general aim of replacing the Interim Agreement with a permanent agreement, Vorontsov asked whether I thought this could be done in one step, or possibly in several steps culminating in a full permanent agreement. I replied that his question itself contained an answer by raising the possibility of partial steps along the way to achievement of a permanent agreement superseding the Interim Agreement. I asked if the Soviet side was thinking of such steps, perhaps as "add-ons" to the existing Interim Agreement. Vorontsov replied in the affirmative. He said that Grinevsky was thinking about this question and wished to discuss it with me during the first phase of SALT TWO, since it was better not to wait for what could have to be hurried consideration. I asked if he had in mind something this spring, perhaps before May. Vorontsov again responded in the affirmative, saying we should seek some additional measures for use at the May Summit meeting, and that it was therefore useful to start thinking about them now.

I asked what Vorontsov and Grinevsky had been thinking about in that connection. Vorontsov said perhaps in effect, though not necessarily formally, adding bombers and FBS to the interim limitation on missiles. I did not comment except to observe that I assumed from what he had said that Vorontsov considered it beyond reasonable expectation to reach a fuller permanent agreement in that period of time. Vorontsov confirmed that he did.

SCC

I noted that the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission was on the "agenda". Vorontsov agreed, and said that he foresaw no problem. I agreed, but noted that it would be necessary to decide such questions as the composition of the SCC, etc. Vorontsov concurred, and added "and its relation to the Delegations". I said I assumed that it could have separate representatives or involve some of the same people. Vorontsov said that the Soviet side favored giving a "second hat" to members of the SALT Delegation.

SALT ONE

I advised Vorontsov that the US intends to publish the interpretive Understandings in the US Treaty Series, but intends to register only the signed ABM Treaty, Interim Agreement, and Protocol with the UN. This would, of course, in no way prejudice the full standing of the supplementary Understandings. Vorontsov expressed full agreement, and commented that the

SECRET/NODIS

5

US had already published the Understandings in its presentation to the Congress and was at liberty to do so for any internal purposes. At the same time, he was pleased that the US was not raising the question of including such Understandings in registration with the UN, since that would have created a problem.

CCD - CTB and CW

Following our discussion of SALT, Vorontsov asked my view of prospects for serious attention to a comprehensive test ban at the CCD. I asked whether the Soviets were ready to agree to some on-site inspections. Vorontsov replied "certainly not", that verification means were already sufficiently effective and were constantly improving. He thought that Sweden and others would even object to on-site inspection as unnecessary and "discriminatory" to the other countries. In any case, the Soviets saw no justification whatsoever for on-site inspections in connection with a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

I suggested that in that case perhaps there would be more prospect for progress in the CCD on CW. Vorontsov said US should drop its "exception" for tear gas. He asked if we had held back because of possible contingent use in Vietnam. I said that was not the reason, but we think that only lethal CW agents should be considered. Vorontsov commented that use of tear gas could, in conjunction with other weapons, have lethal results. He also remarked that we could still use tear gas for internal situations. However, he conceded the point when I mentioned that it would not be very good to use such materials in dealing with internal disturbances if we had agreed to ban their use internationally on human grounds. Vorontsov noted that the USSR does not use tear gas for dealing with domestic situations. He hoped there would be progress leading to a CW treaty this coming year, and perhaps a CTB the year after.

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